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This thesis presents an analysis of the August 1991 Soviet coup from
a command, control, and communications (C3) perspective. Through the
use of C3 modeling and functional decomposition, the C3 systems
developed by the State Committee for the State of the Emergency (SCSE)
and the reformist opposition to the coup are examined and the most
significant strengths and weaknesses are identified. The comparative model
developed for the study, the Coup Operations Process Model (COPM), is
an extrapolation of C3 military operations process models. The COPM
incorporates the C3 characteristics of crisis management and introduces the
concept of a controllable interface separating the immediate and extended
operational environments. Specific political, military, and media events
preceding the coup are examined to determine critical developmental
factors which influenced the structure and operational dynamics of C3
systems employed at the start of the coup. Analysis of the development and
execution of the coup substantiates the importance of C3 in the conduct of
crisis operations and identifies the key C3 functions which directly affected




II. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATION
PROCESS MODELS 3
A. C3 PROCESS MODELS 4
1. Boyd's O-O-D-A Loop Model 5
2. Lawson's C3I Process Model 7
3. Conceptual Combat Operations Process Model 7
4. Coup Operations Process Model 11
B. SUMMARY 13
III. PRELUDE TO THE COUP 14
A. KEY PARTICIPANTS 14
1
.
The State Committee for the State of the Emergency 14
2. Prominent Coup Supporters 17
3 Opposition Leadership 19
B. DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS 20
1. Political Developments 21
2. Armed Forces Developments 28
3 Media developments 38
C. SUMMARY 40
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COUP AND CONCLUSIONS 42
A. CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 42
1. August 16 42
2. August 18 42
3. August 19 44
4. August 20 47











Higher levels of control 57
6. Lower levels of control 61
7. Intelligence/Analysis 61
8 Interface 63
C. SUMMARY * 66
LIST OF REFERENCES 68
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 72
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Soviet coup of August 1991 represented the culmination of a year-long
political effort on the part of Communist Party hard-liners to retain the vestiges
of a centralized Soviet government. Faced with the impending signing of the All-
Union treaty, the conservatives launched an "eleventh-hour" military junta which
attempted to ensure the solidarity of the state. A key factor leading to the failure
of the State Committee for the State of the Emergency (SCSE) was a marked
inability to develop and employ a C3 system capable of managing the crisis.
The foundation for the SCSE was laid by Gorbachev's return to the right in
the fall of 1990. His cultivation and indulgence of the conservatives allowed the
establishment of a right-wing power base and the creation of a reactionary
shadow government which was to become the SCSE. The formal structures of
control required by the SCSE were likewise developed by Gorbachev through his
attempt to increase the power of the executive branch of government. The
measures created a Cabinet of Ministers, a Security Council, and a Coordinating
Agency for the Supervision of Law and Order staffed primarily by hard-line
conservatives.
Gorbachev's embracement of the conservatives came to an abrupt end in
April 1991 with the announcement of the Nine-plus-One agreement. Direct
political action to limit Gorbachev's authority was attempted by the reactionary
Soyuz faction of the Supreme Soviet and by Pavlov and the Cabinet of Ministers.
The attempts were suppressed by Gorbachev, but effective action was not taken
against his would-be usurpers.
The military power structure of the SCSE reflected the deep rifts which
existed within the Soviet armed forces. Control and coordination was limited to
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the highest levels of Army, KGB and MVD command with minimal effort
expended to cultivate the support of subordinates and commanders of other
services. Although High Command rhetoric extolled the role and responsibility
of the military to preserve the state, the common soldier proved to be both unable
and unwilling to undertake the task.
The potential impact of Soviet media was greatly underestimated by the SCSE
and late attempts at censorship and control proved to be ineffective. The SCSE
further failed to accurately assess the reactions of Western powers to the coup
and were unable to stem the flow of support from the West to Yeltsin and the
opposition.
The events of the coup are analyzed through the use of C3 modeling and
functional decomposition. The C3 systems developed by the State Committee for
the State of the Emergency and the reformist opposition to the coup are examined
and the most significant strengths and weaknesses are identified. The C3
deficiencies of the SCSE were key elements in the in the ultimate failure of the
coup. Through a combination of incomplete preparation and poor
implementation, the SCSE was never capable of establishing a functional C3
system. The major areas of internal weakness were determined to be in the
functional areas of sense, decide, interface control, and higher and lower levels of
force control. The weaknesses of the SCSE's C3I system were amplified by the
strengths of the opposition's system. The major areas of strength were
determined to be in the functional areas of intelligence analysis, decide, and
higher levels of force control. More importantly, the individual successes
culminated in the formation of a complete C3I loop structure capable of
operating in a more expedient fashion than the flawed SCSE loop. As
demonstrated during the coup, this advantage allowed the opposition to operate a
step ahead of the SCSE.

I. INTRODUCTION
Success or failure in crisis situations is dependent upon the
establishment and maintenance of a viable command, control, and
communications (C3) system and the ability to deny these capabilities to
opposition forces. The structure and operating dynamics of an employed
C3 system are potential early indicators of success or failure during crisis
management operations.
The prime focus of this study centers on the failed Soviet coup of
August 1991. Traditional analysis of government upheaval has generally
focused upon the various political, economic and social factors which have
served as both the impetus and determinants of success of failure for a
coup. The expedient and epic failure of the State Committee for the State
of the Emergency (SCSE) has resulted in the popular analysis of the Soviet
coup in terms which parallel the precepts of contemporary analysis of C3
systems. As stated by the author Tatyana Tolstaya:
Everybody knows how to pull off a coup d'etat. You must
identify and destroy your principal enemy, so that the crowd
has nobody to support; you must cut off all communications
that might assist your enemy in making contact with the
outside world; you must dispatch troops into the centers of
potential resistance (troops that differ in nationality and
religion from the people you wish to suppress);and you must
mollify and reassure the people with the immediate
distribution of food, drinks and goods. (Tolstaya, 91, p. 18).
The situation in Moscow could not have been more different; Russian
President Yeltsin was never arrested, Russian soldiers stood by, without
orders or ammunition, unwilling to support the SCSE, communications
were not interrupted and foreign and domestic journalists operated with
minimal interference. The failure of the SCSE to seize and maintain
control may be attributed to two major aspects of C3; 1) inadequate
planning and 2) an ineffective C3 system.
The structural framework for analysis is developed in Chapter II. The
basic principles of C3 are discussed and a series of C3 operational process
models are presented. The special attributes of coup operations are
represented in a model developed by the author, the Coup Operations
Process Model.
Chapter III focuses on the significant participants of the coup and
chronicles the major political, military and media developments which
preceded the attempted imposition of hard-line rule in the Soviet Union.
Chapter IV summarizes the significant events of the three days of the
coup, and through the application of the Coup Operations Process Model,
presents an analysis of the C3 systems employed by the SCSE and the
opposition forces. The chapter closes with the identification of the key C3
failures and successes which led to the demise of the SCSE.
II. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATION
PROCESS MODELS
Command, control, and communications (C3) and its derivatives are
not readily nor universally defined. As stated by Kenneth L. Moll:
One of the least controversial things that can be said about
command and control (C3) is that it is controversial, poorly
understood, and subject to wildly different interpretations.
The term can mean almost everything from military
computers to the art of generalship: whatever the user wishes
it to mean. (Orr, 83, p. 23).
Whereas the focus of this thesis is directed toward the analysis of C3
processes
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a baseline definition of command and control is required as a
structural framework. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication No. 1 provides
the official Department of Defense definition of command and control:
The exercise of authority by a properly designated
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the
mission. Command and control functions are performed
through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities and procedures which are employed
by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the
mission. (Department of Defense, 84, pp. 76-77).
As defined, command and control encompasses the means and processes by
which a commander may control available forces in a manner consistent
with mission accomplishment. A command and control system
encompasses all of the above elements and delineates the requisite
structures to facilitate the command process. The system may be relatively
static, as in the case as of strategic command systems, or dynamic as in the
development of contingency or crisis response systems. In either case,
however, the command process must be structured in a manner consistent
with basic C3 system models. The models are all consistent in their
depiction of C3 systems as closed loop processes linked directly with the
operational environment. The remainder of this chapter addresses these
basic models with an emphasis upon the unique characteristics of crisis
response systems.
A. C3 PROCESS MODELS
The basic function of C3 process models is to delineate the means by
which a commander may use available personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities and procedures to achieve a specified goal (Orr,
83, p. 24). The models emphasize the dynamic nature of the C3 process
and reinforce the cause and effect relationship inherent in command
decisions. Furthermore, the models provide a means to gauge relative
command effectiveness as quantified by the efficiency and expediency of an
implemented C3 system and the capability to deny these system attributes to
the opposition.
1. Boyd's O-O-D-A Loop Model
The basic model presented by Colonel John Boyd during a briefing
to the Air War College encompasses the essential elements of a C3 system
(On, 83, p. 26). As depicted in Figure 1, the model reinforces the concepts
of a closed loop C^ process and the a cause and effect relationship between
the C3 system and the operational environment. The model decomposes









Figure 1. Boyd's O-O-D-A Loop Model
a. Observe
Boyd's observe function serves as the link between the C3
system and the environment. The function encompasses the myriad of
detection, surveillance and warning equipment and facilities available to the
commander for obtaining the information to develop a comprehensive
picture of the operational environment.
b. Orient
The orient function is the means by which the commander
correlates the information obtained through the observe function. The
function provides for the comparison of the current state of the
environment with the required state consistent with mission
accomplishment.
c. Decide
The decide function encompasses the many processes which
interact to define the command decision process. Whereas a detailed
analysis of these processes is beyond the scope of this work, the time
critical nature of this process warrants discussion. The function further
provides for the development of courses of action and the selection of those
alternatives which are best suited to the operational environment. Given
the both the responsiveness and quantity of modern information gathering,
display and dissemination systems, the decide function has the greatest
potential to serve as the major impediment to the expedient cycling of the
loop system. As postulated by Boyd, success or failure in battle can often
be directly attributed to the ability of one force to cycle through its C3
system loop faster than its opponents.
d. Act
The act function provides the means by which the selected
course of actions are implemented by the commander. The function
includes both the methods of dissemination and the force structure
developed in support of the commander. The act function serves as the
output link between the C3 system and the environment,
e. Environment
The environment, in the strict military sense, encompasses the
region of operations of direct concern to the commander and within the
influence of the commander's C3 system. Depending upon the level of
command, the environment can be as limited as the airspace shared by two
combatant aircraft or as extensive as an entire theater of operations.
2. Lawson's C3I Process Model
As depicted in Figure 2, the C3I model developed by Dr. Joel S.
Lawson has a clear relationship to the O-O-D-A loop concepts introduced
by Boyd (Orr, 83, p. 25). The key differences between the combat process
models of Boyd and Lawson are related to the degree of complexity and
the specific inclusion of the intelligence process by Lawson. The
intelligence process has been separately decomposed to accommodate the
increasingly independent operation of intelligence activity within higher
levels of command authority (Orr, 83, p. 27).
3. Conceptual Combat Operations Process Model
The Conceptual Combat Operations Process Model (CCOPM)
developed by Major George E. Orr provides the basic framework for
remainder of this thesis. Accordingly, the model, as depicted in Figure 3,
must be examined in greater depth than the models of Boyd and Lawson.
The model is designed to provide a simple tool for the evaluation of C3I in
combat operations while providing sufficient detail to explain the theories
and principles advanced by Boyd and Lawson (Orr, 83, p. 26). The
essential differences of the CCOPM are in the inclusion of interfaces with
the higher and lower levels of the force structure and the inclusion of a
generic intelligence/analysis block which encompasses both information
transfer and the passing of orders and queries between levels of control
hierarchy (Orr, 83, p. 27). The functional decomposition of the model
has been expanded to include additional attributes relevant to crisis













Figure 2. Lawson's C3I Process Model
a. Sense
The sense function includes the systems and procedures
available to gather data on the environment. The goal of the sense function
is to provide continuous coverage of the environment under all conditions
with an emphasis on accuracy and timeliness. Sensory systems include
traditional military active and passive sensors (radar, optical,
electromagnetic, etc.) and the improvised (foreign broadcasts, telephones,
fax machines, etc.) which proved to be essential elements in the Soviet
coup. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the sensors to countermeasiires is










Figure 3. Orr's Conceptual Combat Operations Process Model
b. Process
The process function provides the means by which the data
gathered from the environment, as amended by intelligence guidance and
information, is correlated to determine the occurrence of specific events or
situations (Orr, 83, p. 28).
c. Decide
The decide function and the decision-making subprocess are
both exceedingly complex and not very well understood (Orr, 83, p. 29).
A review of the multitude of theories concerning the human decision
process is of limited value in providing a structural framework for
assessing the Soviet coup. Analysis of the decide function is directed
towards critical decisions points during the crisis and the effectiveness of
the decisions realized and the ramifications of decisions not made by the
coup and opposition command structures rather, than the actual decision
process.
d. Act
The act function serves as the interface between the
commander or decision-maker and the environment and is the means to
force or influence changes in the environment that are determined to be
desirable. The function transcends the simple application of coercive force
and encompasses the full range of political, economic and military options
available to control the environment. (Orr, 83, p. 29)
e. Higher and lower levels of control
The function blocks of higher and lower levels represent the
force structures available to the commander for the enactment and control
of measures implemented by the act function. The functions may be
considered to represent a generic model of the military chain of command.
With respect to the Soviet coup, the blocks serve as the basis for the
analysis of both existing control hierarchies and ad hoc structures
developed in response to the crisis.
10
f. Intelligence/Analysis
The intelligence/analysis function includes a variety of
specialized processes and procedures. Whereas the exact details of these
processes are not relevant to the conceptual context of the model, two
essential tasks are worthy of mention. First, is the search, by both overt
and covert means, for information regarding the organization, structure,
capabilities, and intentions of unfriendly forces. Information on political,
economic and other nonmilitary matters is also of relevance and of
particular importance within the area of the Soviet coup. The information
serves as a framework for assigning meaning to observed activities and
situations. The second critical task is the development of forecasts with
respect to changes in the current situation. The forecasts impact upon the
sense and decide functions by indicating where and what to look for and
providing assessments of the situation and evaluations of the probable
consequences of proposed actions. As stated by Orr and reinforced by the
Soviet coup, careful preparation beforehand is a critical key to success.
(Orr, 83, p. 28)
g. Environment
The environment, as in Boyd's O-O-D-A model, encompasses
the region of operations of concern to the commander and within the
influence of his C3I system.
4. Coup Operations Process Model
An expansion of the CCOPM, the Coup Operations Process Model
(COPM) has been structured to represent the interaction between coup and
opposition force C3I systems. The model, as represented in Figure 4, has
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been tailored to represent the arrangement of C3I systems relevant to an
internal government coup, but has the capability to represent coup attempts
from external forces. The functional concept of the environment has been
divided into an immediate operational environment and an extended
environment. The operational environment represents the local area of
operations. Dependent upon the scope and nature of the coup, the
operational environment may encompass a single city or extend throughout
a nation. The primary interaction between C3I systems occurs within the
operational environment. The extended environment represents an area of
interest to the coup or opposition force that is external to the direct control
of the forces' C3I system. Again, the specific boundaries of this
environment is dependent upon the scope and nature of coup events. The
principal refinement of the COPM is the inclusion of the extended
environment and a controllable interface between this environment and the
opposition C3I system. The interface serves as a secondary point of system
interaction and represents a critical area of control which the author
considers a key element in the conduct of a successful coup. The interface
serves as the means to isolate opposition forces from the extended
environment and potential sources of information, intelligence, and
support. The capability to control this interface determines which C3I
system is allocated to the right half of the model.
The success or failure of the coup and opposition C3I systems is
dependent upon the implementation of each of the functional areas and the
ability to link the areas into a responsive C3I cycle. The viability of the
C3I cycle is of particular importance as concerns a crisis situation. The
1 2
compressed time-table and ad hoc organization inherent in crisis
management provides a significant advantage to a C3I system capable of
expedient cycling and flexible response to changing situations.
EXTENDED ENVIRONMENT
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Figure 4. Coup Operations Process Model
B. SUMMARY
The chapter has outlined the significant features of C3 and C3I process
models with an emphasis on crisis control attributes. The model developed
by the author, the COPM, provides the framework for the subsequent
analysis of the prelude to and the conduct of the Soviet coup.
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III. PRELUDE TO THE COUP
An examination of the events leading up to the Soviet coup provides a
solid foundation for the analysis of the events of August 1991 . The chapter
develops background information as concerns the major participants in the
coup and the significant political, military and media developments leading
up to and greatly influencing the events of the coup.
A. KEY PARTICIPANTS
1. The State Committee for the State of the Emergency
The consolidation of hard-line, conservative communists which
was to evolve into the State Committee for the State of the Emergency
(SCSE) was precipitated by Gorbachev's swing to the right in the fall of
1990 and resultant personnel changes initiated within the highest levels of
the Soviet government. Ultimately, six of the eight members of the SCSE
were appointed by Gorbachev himself. The prospects for the consolidation
and implementation of power by a conservative coalition were enhanced
by three major structural changes to the Soviet government. The changes
announced by Gorbachev on November 17, 1990 were aimed at
strengthening the executive branch and consisted of the creation of a USSR
Cabinet of Ministers, directly subordinate to the president, to replace the
USSR Council of Ministers; the creation of a Security Council; and the
establishment of a Coordinating Agency for the supervision of Law and
Order (Ross, 91, p. 1). The following paragraphs address the backgrounds
of the eight members of the SCSE.
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a. Gennadii Ivanovich Yanayev
Gennadii Yanayev, the nominal leader of the SCSE, was
elected to his position as Vice President of the Soviet Union in December
1990. Yanayev's rise to power was through the Communist youth group,
Komsomol, until his appointment to the Politburo in 1990. A committed
member of the right wing, Yanayev's appointment as Vice President was
strongly opposed by liberal and reformist factions of the Party. Having
failed to be elected on the first ballot, Yanayev's political aspirations were
sustained by President Gorbachev who pleaded to the Soviet Congress of
Peoples deputies that "I want someone alongside me I can trust".
(Hitchings, 91, p. 622)
b. Valentin Sergeevich Pavlov
Valentin Pavlov was appointed as Prime Minister by
Gorbachev in January 1991. Formerly the Soviet Finance Minister, Pavlov
had a reputation as an old-style bureaucrat with little faith in free market
reforms. His distrust of the West was evidenced by his accusations in
February, 1991 that Western bankers were attempting to topple the Soviet
government by flooding the international market with rubles. Pavlov
countered by ordering the withdrawal of large currency notes, an
unpopular action with the Soviet populace. (Hitchings, 91, p. 622)
c. Dmitrii Timofeevich Yazov
Marshal Yazov was appointed Defense Minister by Gorbachev
in May 1987 following the landing of a private German aircraft on Red
Square. At the time of his appointment, Yazov was considered a
Gorbachev-style reformist and was credited with spearheading the house
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cleaning of top defense personnel during the mid-eighties. With the
shifting of the Soviet political spectrum to the left, Yazov came to be
regarded as a conservative opponent to reform and was increasingly
angered by media criticism of the military and anti-military sentiment in
the non-Russian republics. (Foye, 91, p. 12)
d. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov
Vladimir Kryuchkov was appointed as Chairman of the KGB
by Gorbachev in 1988. Considered a conservative hard-liner, Kryuchkov
had openly assailed Gorbachev's reforms as "blind radicalism" (Hitchings,
91, p. 622). Experienced in the use of force to accommodate political
goals, Kryuchkov had served in the Soviet Embassy in Budapest in 1956,
when Moscow brutally suppressed the Hungarian uprising, assisted in the
preparations for the military coup in Poland in December 1981 and also
supervised the assassination of Afghan President Amin in December, 1979
(Trimble, 91, p. 57, Kagarlitsky, 91, p. 18).
e. Boris Karlovich Pugo
Appointed Interior Minister by Gorbachev in 1990, Pugo had
extensive experience within the both the Communist Party and the KGB in
the the Republic of Latvia. An opponent of economic reform, Pugo had
blamed liberal economic policies for the Soviet Union's growing domestic
problems. (Hitchings, 91, p. 622)
f. Oleg Dmitrievich Baklanov
First Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council and Communist
Party Secretary in charge of the military-industrial complex, Baklanov
represented the interests of the defense industries, which had been in
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turmoil because of arms treaties and the loosening of central economic
controls. (Keller, 91, p. A16)
g. Vasilii Alekssandrovich Starodubstev
Chairman of the Farmer's Union and a member of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party, Starodubstev was the principal
spokesman for opposition to marked zation, privatization, or land reform
among Soviet farm managers. He was on the emergency committee as a
representative of the peasantry, a group he insisted had suffered more than
any other under perestroika and that would support the restoration of
order (Atta, 91, p. 5).
h. Aleksandr Ivanovich Tizyakov
President of the Association of State Enterprises and
Industrial, Construction, Transport, and Communications Facilities,
Tizyakov was considered to be party loyalist. (Hitchings, 91, p. 622)
2. Prominent Coup Supporters
a. Valerii Ivanovich Boldin
Chief of Gorbachev's presidential staff and member of the
USSR Security Council, Boldin was in a position to control the flow of
information to the President and influence his perceptions of the growing
unrest among hard-line government factions. (Smith, 91, p. 627)
b. Oleg Shenin
As the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central
Committee Secretary, Shenin was capable of controlling the flow of party
information to President Gorbachev in the manner of Boldin. (Smith, 91,
p. 627)
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c. General Valentin Varennikov
Commander in Chief of Ground Forces, Army General
Varennikov was one of the most experienced commanders in the Soviet
military. A veteran of WW II and former head of the military operations
group overseeing the war effort in Afghanistan, Varennikov was appointed
as head of Soviet ground forces by Gorbachev in May 1989. An outspoken
opponent of political liberalization and republican autonomy, he
epitomized the growing politicization of the Soviet High Command as
concerned the prospect of a divided union. Varennikov was among the
most fervent opponents of independence for the Baltic republics and was a
major figure in both negotiations and military operations conducted in the
region. He is suspected as being a member of a differentiated command
structure consisting of select army units and their counterparts in the KGB
andMVD. (Foye, 91, p. 14)
d. Lt. Gen Yuri Plekhanov
Chief of the KGB Security Service for Soviet Leaders,
Plekhanov was an essential figure in ensuring access to Gorbachev's retreat
at Foros. (Smith, 91, p. 627)
e. Anatolii Ivanovich Lukyanov
Chairman of the Soviet Parliament and long term associate of
Gorbachev, Lukyanov was highly critical of the prospective Union treaty
which he considered "dangerous" and in need of redrafting to shift power
back to the central government. Though not a direct participant, Lukyanov
was considered the "chief ideologist" for the junta (Keller, 91, p. A16).
The long standing patron of the reactionary "Soyuz" faction of
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parliamentary deputies, Lukyanov has been considered the preferred choice
of the conservative Party apparatus, the KGB, and the military-industrial
complex as successor to Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union
(Wishnevsky, 91, p. 8).
3. Opposition Leadership
a. Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin
Yeltsin's transition from a hard-driving provincial Party boss
to a reformist participant in the Soviet central government began in 1985
with his promotion into the Politburo. Selected by Gorbachev for the
position, Yeltsin seemingly betrayed his benefactor through a series of
attacks against the General Secretary and his government. Yeltsin's public
and private challenges against Gorbachev culminated at a Central
Committee meeting in October 1987. In what was a moment of Party self-
congratulation, Yeltsin rose to tell the Party bosses that "in the eyes of the
people the Party's authority has drastically fallen", to chastise the Party for
going to slow on perestroika, and to warn against leaving Gorbachev
"totally immune from criticism," because such adulation could bring a new
"cult of personality"-a chilling echo of the euphemism once used to
describe Stalin's dictatorship (Smith, 91, p. 448). Althougth the statements
resulted in his political excommunication to a minor ministry post, they
elevated him to the status of a folk hero to the Soviet people. The Russian
Republic presidential election of March 1989 marked Yeltsin's return to
the political center stage. In the face of stern opposition by the Party
apparat and the military, Yeltsin staged an impressive campaign which
took direct aim at the weaknesses of the Communist Party. His ability to
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rally the citizens and soldiers of Russia resulted in a landslide victory in
which he claimed eighty-nine percent of the popular vote, including the
support of forty-four percent of the Russian military (Smith, 91, p. 450).
b. Alexsandr Rutskoi
A key element behind the military's support of Yeltsin was his
selection of Colonel Alexsandr Rutskoi as his vice-president. Rutskoi, an
army hero from the Afghan war, was well respected within the military
and able to fully exploit his connections within the military during the
course of the coup. (Smith, 91, pp. 619, 636)
c. Konstantin Kobets
Kobets, a retired Colonel General of the Soviet Army, was
recruited by Yeltsin in January 1990 to lead the State Committee on
Defense Issues. Kobets, in turn, assembled a small staff of reform-minded
former officers and established the foundation of an extensive intelligence
network which proved to be of vital importance during the coup. (Cullen,
91, p. 58)
B. DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS
The attempt and dismal failure of the Soviet coup was the result of both
immediate and long term political, military and social developments within
the Soviet Union. The origins of the action may be traced to its root cause;
the election of Gorbachev as CPSU General Secretary in 1985 and the
announcement of perestroika and glasnost (Mann, 91, p. 1). Conservative
opposition to Gorbachev's reforms and the subsequent struggles within and
against the Communist Party laid the framework for the emergence of
hard-line factions dedicated to the preservation of the USSR, the
20
fundamental precepts of communism, and the power and privileges
afforded to the power elite of the Soviet government. Additionally, the
freedoms afforded by the Gorbachev reforms, particularly with respect to
the media and press, served to expose both the excesses of the Party elite
and the shortcomings of the Soviet system of government. These long term
factors were the foundation for the polarization of Soviet society and the
resultant factionalization of the Soviet government and military.
The stagnation of reforms and economic programs, the shift of political
power from the center to the republics and increased reformist opposition
to Gorbachev in the fall of 1990 formed the prelude to Gorbachev's
embracement of the conservatives as a means to restore his rapidly
diminishing power base. His cultivation and indulgence of the
conservatives from September 1990 to April 1991 allowed the
establishment of a right-wing power base and the creation of a reactionary
shadow government which ultimately sought to undermine the presidency
following Gorbachev's return to the reformists and his support for the
Union Treaty. This period of transition is the focus of the following
sections concerning the political, military and media developments during
the prelude to the coup.
1 . Political Developments
In September 1990, under the pressure of conservatives in the
government, in the military-industrial complex and in the military,
Gorbachev withdrew his support of the radical "500 Days" plan of
economic reform and began his turn to the right (Mann, 91, p. 3). His
actions were an attempt to halt a process he had initiated, the gradual
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rendering of his own power bases-the USSR government and the
Communist party- toward obsolescence. Gorbachev's own rhetoric turned
increasingly reactionary and he warned that attempts to break up the Union
could result in bloodshed. He further intended to use the strengthened
powers of the presidency to enforce compliance with all-Union laws.
The strengthening of the executive branch of government was the
driving force behind the aforementioned proclamation by Gorbachev on
November 17, 1990 which called for a radical restructuring of the Soviet
government. The measures sought to overcome the paralysis that had
befallen the central government in the wake of the Twenty-Eighth Party
Congress and the withdrawal of the Party as the direct manager of the
economy and the only partial allocation of power to the presidency (Ross,
91, p. 1). The resultant power vacuum at the center was further
exacerbated by the declaration of sovereignty and independence by all of
the fifteen Soviet republics. The creation of the Council of the Federation
and the Cabinet of Ministers were the initial steps toward the
reconsolidation of power to the center. On November 23, 1990 the power
of the presidency was strengthened further with the Supreme Soviet
resolution allowing the Gorbachev to rule by decree in emergencies.
Although this centralization of power and administrative restructuring has
been dismissed as "Krushchev-like harebrained schemes to buy time" (Ross,
91, p. 14), the underlying effect of consolidating and empowering the
conservative faction cannot be overlooked. From the appointment of
Pavlov as Prime Minister on January 14, 1991 to the Supreme Soviet
approval of a Security Council staffed in the majority by future members
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of the SCSE on March 13, 1991, Gorbachev presided over the creation of a
coercive machine opposed to further political reform as evidenced by
Pavlov's remarks before the Supreme Soviet on February 20, 1991:
Can we now let ourselves embark on the complete
elimination of sectoral organs of management, as some
comrades who consider themselves radicals are proposing? I
am convinced we cannot.. ..This is a sphere in which state
ownership must prevail and in which we will delay
privatization for a while. (Ross, 91, p. 4).
The proposals initiated by Gorbachev and his subsequent
appointments to the new organs of government required the approval of
the Supreme Soviet. This constitutional requirement is introduced not to
mitigate Gorbachev's role in the development of the SCSE, but rather to
illustrate the influence of the conservative parliamentary faction, Soyuz,
during the prelude to the coup. The Soyuz, considered the mouthpiece of
the Soviet military leadership and of the conservative Communist Party
officials who suffered defeat by democrats and nationalists during republic
elections, has been attributed to being the brainchild of Supreme Soviet
Chairman Lukyanov (Wishnevsky, 91, p. 9). Founded in February 1990,
the Soyuz was committed to the preservation of the Union and the
strengthening of the KGB, the Army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MVD). The faction was the single largest within the Supreme Soviet and
was actively courted by Gorbachev in the fall of 1990 as a means to ensure
the success of his proposals and to placate growing unrest within Soyuz
with respect to his policies. The combined effect was a further swing to
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the right for Gorbachev and a dramatic increase in the ability of the Soyuz
to affect the executive branch of the Soviet government as evidenced by the
resignations of the reformist Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Interior
Minister Bakatin, as well as the Soyuz-backed approval of Vice President
Yanayev.
The resignation of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on
December 20, 1990 marked the emergence of reformist opposition to the
increased influence of hard-line reactionaries within the Soviet
government. In his speech to the Congress of People's Deputies,
Shevardnadze warned that "dictatorship is coming" and called upon Soviet
democrats to oppose right wing reactionaries (Crow, 91, p. 30). He then
added that he had been haunted by "reactionaries", whom he did not name
but identified as "two deputies with colonel's epaulettes", a reference to
Soyuz leaders Viktor Alksnis and Nikolai Petrushenko (Wishnevsky, 91, p.
11). He then proceeded to implicate Lukyanov as the influential force
behind the colonels and the key element to their success in "settling their
scores" (Wishnevsky, 91, p. 1 1). As was the case in Gorbachev's action of
November 17, the Shevardnadze resignation had implication beyond the
event, namely the creation of a rallying point for reformists.
The "December-May" romance between the Gorbachev and the
hard-liners came to an abrupt end on April 23, 1991 with the signing of the
Nine-plus-One agreement at Novo Ogarevo (Mann, 91, p. 4). The
negotiations at Nogo Ogarevo, at which decisions affecting the future of the
country were made privately by a small group of leaders, sent shock waves
through the conservative factions of the Soviet Union. The agreement,
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approved by nine of the fifteen Soviet republics, acknowledged the
independence of the Baltic States, Moldavia, Georgia and Armenia and
called for national elections within six months of the Union treaty's signing
(Mann, 91, p. 4). The Supreme Soviet was dismayed by the Nogo Ogarevo
negotiations and the apparent usurpation of their power. Additionally, the
terms of the agreement would result in the premature termination of their
terms of office. Upon receipt of a revised draft of the treaty, Lukyanov
argued, with the support of numerous deputies, for increased Supreme
Soviet influence over the structure and terms of the agreement. The
Supreme Soviet, however, was without authority to reject the Union treaty
which was previously approved by the USSR Congress of People's
Deputies. Discontent with the treaty was most prevalent within the Soyuz
faction of deputies which considered the agreement a grave threat to the
integrity of the union. The Soyuz in response to the treaty and
Gorbachev's return to reformism initiated a campaign to convene an
emergency meeting of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, at which
the faction hoped Gorbachev would be recalled and a state of emergency
declared (Mann, 91, p. 4). Although the Soyuz deputies failed to garner
adequate support within the Congress of People's Deputies, their public
display of dissatisfaction was a decisive indicator of conservative
discontent within the government.
An additional setback befell the conservatives on June 12, 1991
with the election of Yeltsin as the president of the Russian Republic in a
landslide popular election. Yeltsin, who resigned from the CPSU in July
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1990, had enacted an aggressive program to curb the power of the party
within the Russian republic.
Hard-line opposition to Gorbachev and his return to reform
mounted on June 17, 1991 when Prime Minister Pavlov, following a report
to the Supreme Soviet on the socioeconomic and sociopolitical situation,
requested an expansion of his cabinet's authority. Specifically, Pavlov
requested the right of legislative initiative as a means to streamline the
cabinet's oversight of the rapidly failing economy. Citing Gorbachev's
demanding workload, Pavlov asserted that increased power for the cabinet
was the only means to avert economic ruin. Pavlov failed to consult with
Gorbachev prior to his request, but the subsequent two days of closed-door
testimony in the Supreme Soviet indicated prior collaboration with Yazov,
Pugo and Kryuchkov.
Debate within the Supreme Soviet echoed the conservative
discontent voiced earlier by Soyuz and was directed toward the reduction
of Gorbachev's power, if not his outright elimination. Soyuz proposed the
introduction of testimony by cabinet ministers, with Yazov, Pugo and
Kryuchkov quickly arriving with testimony already in hand. The common
theme of the testimony was a direct attack on Gorbachev and perestroika,
described as "cold, hunger and inadequate defense" (Mann, 91, p. 3). The
ministers, affecting Cold War rhetoric, cited continuing Western threats to
the Soviet Union and advocated a unified USSR as the only defense.
Following two days of scathing criticism and debate, Lukyanov urged the
the Supreme Soviet to grant Pavlov's request and amplified the
conservatives' desire to retain centralized control:
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If we do not resort to extraordinary measures, the country
will perish. Will perish - do you understand this?. ..There is
no governing center in the country today. The cabinet is
making this plea: "Untie our hands, let us do something for the
country." We need decisions, and instead some people are
speculating what if the cabinet usurps power? This is
ridiculous. (Mann, 91, p. 2).
Gorbachev responded to Pavlov's attempted "constitutional coup"
in a forceful and accusatory thirty-minute address to the Supreme Soviet on
June 21. In a speech seemingly more critical of the parliament than of his
wayward ministers, Gorbachev accused the assembly of being completely
detached from reality and stressed his continued support of Pavlov and the
cabinet:
...the full support of the president, the full support. There
is no crisis in relations with Pavlov, and I hope there won't be,
although, you know, such a time of responsibility rests with
the executive power and I don't delude myself-inasmuch as I
head (the executive)-we're functioning in extreme conditions,
the most difficult, perhaps, for many of us since the Great
Patriotic War. (Mann, 91, p. 4).
Gorbachev ended his speech with an appeal to the deputies for greater
cooperation and dismissed the conservative threat to his authority. The
Supreme Soviet responded by voting to pass Pavlov's request to the
president for further study, a motion tantamount to legislative death.
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Confident in the progress achieved during the Novo Ogarevo negotiations
and the promise of a new decentralized USSR, Gorbachev allowed his
would-be usurpers to remain in power. Upon the conclusion of the
Supreme Soviet Session, he appeared for the press with Pugo, Yazov and
Kryuchkov and confidently quipped "the coup is over" (Keller, 91, p.
A16).
Suppressed but not defeated, the conservatives emerged from the
incident with their power structures relatively intact. Western concern
with respect to the hard-liners was demonstrated in a private meeting
between US Secretary of State Baker and USSR Foreign Minister
Bessmertnykh on June 20,1991. During the discussion, Baker asked
Bessmertnykh to tell Gorbachev that the United States had been informed
that a group of high ranking hard-liners were plotting against him.
(Trimble, 91, p. 58)
Final planning for the August coup appears to have been initiated
around August 6. On that day Gorbachev's spokesman announced August
20 as the date for the signing of the new union treaty (Keller, 91, p. A 16).
The preparations did not go unnoticed by goverment reformists. Two days
prior to the launching of the coup, Alexsandr Yakolev, a former close aide
to Gorbachev, resigned from the Communist Party with a warning that
party hard-liners were readying for a coup (Hitchings, 91, p. 626).
2. Armed Forces Developments
The Soviet armed forces, which shall be considered to include the
forces assigned to the KGB and MVD as well as the traditional elements of
the Soviet military, had never directly attempted to assume power. They
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have, however, lent the specter of force to support leadership changes
viewed as favorable by the holders of high command. Such was the case of
the August putsch; an opportunity for the conservative leadership of the
military, KGB, and MVD to support a hard-line government and check
what was perceived as a fatal weakening of Soviet military power.
Whereas the key leadership elements of the armed forces were more than
willing to assist the SCSE, the majority of forces under their command
were either opposed to the junta or content with waiting out the crisis.
The serious divisions within the Soviet armed forces had mirrored
the divisions within the government discussed in the preceding section.
The accession to power of Gorbachev in 1985 resulted in the division of
the defense community into conservative and liberal camps. The
conservative faction was primarily populated by senior commanders and
political officers, and its leadership was drawn from the Soviet High
Command. The conservative leadership sought to maintain the leading role
of the Communist Party and the preservation of military strength, both
perceived as being in jeopardy as a result of Gorbachev's reforms. Liberal
sentiment, on the other hand, was most prevalent among junior and mid-
grade officers who opposed the military leadership and advocated radical
military reform as the means to ensure a viable defense.
The advocation of conservatism by the Soviet High Command was
reflected in a radicalization of Soviet military ideology as early as 1989
(Carter, 91, p. 16). Proceeded by the unilateral force reductions proposed
by Gorbachev in 1988, Soviet military journals began to publish a series of
articles which reflected a distancing of the High Command from
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perestroika and the development of anti-democratic ideology. The official
journal of the USSR Defense Ministry, Voenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal,
published a string of articles by the militarist writer Karem Rash which
openly advocated the direct intervention of the Soviet military in the
political arena. Referencing the Polish military intervention of 1981, Rash
argued "Who recently saved Poland from national chaos, anarchy and
humiliation? Who held her fast on the edge of an abyss? The Polish
Army!" (Carter, 91, p. 16). The radicalization of Voenno-Istorichesky
Zhurnal continued with the appointment of Rash to the editorial board. Of
greater import, however, was that the journal's dramatic shift to the right
was accompanied by its increased influence and popularity (Carter, 91, p.
17). Throughout 1990 and the first part of 1991, the journal conducted a
concentrated campaign against the liberal press and for an all-Union
Ministry of Defense. The radical views presented by the journal during
this period included; hostility toward "New Political Thinking", fascination
with Hitler's reich, and support for a military coup. The central theme of
these views was the role and responsibility of the army as a maintainer of
internal order. As stated by Viktor Eremin in the journal Nash
Sovremennik:
The chief and only function of the army is the preservation
of the statehood of the people and the territorial integrity of
that statehood. ...And this is why, when civil state power is
falling apart and is not in a condition to. ..defend national
statehood. ..and begins to act in the interests of foreign groups
hostile to the people, the army has not only the right but also
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the duty to become extremely involved in internal affairs.
(Carter, 91, p. 18).
The radical opposition of Soviet militarist writers to reform was
further manifested in the opinions presented by the Soviet High Command.
In a article entitled "A Visit to General Rodionov's Office" published in
the May, 1991 of Den, another reactionary journal, the prospects of a
military dictatorship were discussed with Baklanov, Commander in Chief
of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet Chernavin, and Commander of the
General Staff Academy Colonel General Rodionov. Following a critical
assessment of Gorbachev's defense policy, termed as irrational and a means
to destroy the military and defense industry, the discussion turned toward
the possibility of a military dictatorship. Although careful not to directly
advocate military rule, those present gave the impression that such a
development might be inevitable and that the armed forces would be well
suited for the task. As stated by Baklanov:
The army, if it has to take the responsibility for governing
the economy, transportation, and society as a whole could only
maintain that governing role for a certain period of
time....The armed forces have demonstrated the ability to
create an entire economy, ...and to provide regulation and
command control to millions of components: technological,
social and psychological. (McMichael, 91, p. 10).
A far more direct article appeared in the flagship newspaper of
Soviet hard-line politics, Sovetskaya Rossiya, on July 23, 1991. Entitled
"A Word to the People" and signed by twelve prominent Soviet citizens
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including Generals Varrenikov and Gromov, the article was a direct and
desperate appeal to the Soviet populace to rise up in defiance of the current
government and to resist those "who do not love the country and who are
dooming us to... subjection to our all-powerful neighbors" (McMichael, 91,
p. 10). The authors warned "the bones of the people are being ground up,
and the backbone of Russia is being broken in two" (McMichael, 91, p. 10).
The authors clearly argued for the preservation of Russia as a unified
nation at any cost. The article appealed to the armed forces to be prepared
to be the means by which the USSR would be preserved:
We are convinced that the men of the army and navy,
faithful to their sacred duty, will not allow a fratricidal war or
the destruction of the fatherland, that they will step forth as
the dependable guarantors of security and as the bulwark of all
the healthy force in society. (McMichael, 91, p. 9).
The development of radical ideology coincided with the
restructuring of the armed forces to facilitate the coordination of the
various elements of a coercive apparatus. The joint coordination of joint
internal security operations was assigned to Deputy Minister of Internal
Affairs Gromov in October, 1990 under the auspices of "Operation
Snowstorm", an emergency program dating back to the Brezhnev era. The
program was developed as a means of imposing an emergency regime in
support of the central government. The viability of the program was
greatly enhanced by Gorbachev through his request, and subsequent
Supreme Soviet approval for the establishment of a Coordinating Agency
for the Supervision of Law and Order. The resultant Army-KGB-MVD
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troika was to provide the requisite force structure for the preservation of
the state.
The lead organization for the preservation of domestic order
and the main security force of the MVD was the 350,000-man strong
Internal Forces. The force embarked upon an extensive redeployment and
reequipment under the direction of Gromov. The restructuring focused on
the conversion of the Internal Forces from a static organization of security
guards and prison warders to a mobile force spearheaded by Opnaz
(Operational Designation) elements. The emphasis on mobile, operational
units was reflected in the almost doubling of Opnaz strength to 70,000 men
in less than a year (Galeotti, 91, p. 6). The OMON (Special Mission Militia
Detachments) of the police forces were also under the formal control of the
MVD. The "black beret" riot squads were first established in Leningrad
and Moscow in 1987 with the recruitment of older professionals of proven
maturity. Under Gromov, the OMON experienced an expansion to over
9,000 men and the development of a decidedly paramilitary style with
recruitment of a "second generation" of young ethnic Russians, typically
just detached from the military (Galeotti, 91, p. 6). By the summer of
1991, the OMON had thirty city and regional units distributed throughout
the USSR and had embarked upon a program to establish paramilitary units
in the lower echelons of the police. In addition, entire divisions of the
army were transferred to the MVD, including the 55th Guards Motorized
Rifle Division and Dzerzhinsky Mechanized Division (Galeotti, 91, p. 5).
The KGB force structure mirrored the MVD in the division of
elements between special operational units and static guard elements. The
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majority of manpower belonged to the 230,000-strong Border Guards,
though these forces were dispersed along the expansive Soviet border and
of little potential effectiveness in the enforcement of civil order. Of
greater importance were the special purpose troops or Spetznaz which
mustered approximately 40,000 men. The Spetznaz's primary missions are
counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and, in wartime, deep interdiction
behind enemy lines. The army had also transferred units to the KGB,
including the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, and the KGB had
established a special a special operations command center in the Lubyanka
to coordinate the employment of it's diversified force structure.
The regular army, as a whole, afforded the SCSE with it's
weightiest, but dullest sword. With 1,473,000 troops, the ground forces
represented a major element of force. However, severe internal conflicts,
lack of mobility and disillusionment were serious barriers to effective
employment.
The Army-KGB-MVD troika had ample opportunity to exercise
the command structure developed by the formation of the Coordinating
Agency for the Supervision of Law and Order. The violent crackdown on
Lithuanian and Latvian nationalism in January, 1991 provided the first
major dress rehearsal. Following a carefully orchestrated prelude, which
included the exposing of the dubious "Committee of National Salvation" by
the KGB, the armed forces embarked upon a campaign of intimidation and
terror in Lithuania. The effort culminated in the violent attack on January
13 against a Vilnius television station which left 14 dead. The forces
involved consisted of army paratroopers, MVD OMON forces, the KGB
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special operations "Alpha Group", and special control elements from
Moscow. The action was followed on January 20 with an attack on the
Latvian Interior Ministry by combined MVD and KGB forces. Again
under the guise of a response to an overthrow of the legitimate government
by the "Committee of National Salvation", the troika attempted to turn the
tide of nationalism in the Baltics. Alhough neither effort proved to be
successful, the troika was able to develop the requisite command and
control techniques for civil intervention and developed a boldness and
independence which was to be reflected in its actions of the succeeding
months.
In February 1991, Gromov commanded an exercise in Moscow
designed to test the ability to secure the city in the event of massive
industrial disorder. The event also provided a means to explore the
viability of occupying key centers of power within the government. The
Moscow plans were put to the test on March 28 with a massive security
force effort to control popular protests in support of Yeltsin. The forces
were effective and the authorities proved capable of deploying over 50,000
men from the combined arms of the security apparatus.
Subsequent activities by the armed forces seemed more directed at
weakening Gorbachev's authority and prestige. In early June the official
report of the crackdown in Vilnius was released, coincident with
Gorbachev's visit to Norway for the Nobel Peace Prize. The report
exonerated Soviet forces and attributed the civilian death toll to local
militants. The release was followed by renewed security force activity in
Vilnius which included the establishment of checkpoints and the detainment
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of two members of the Lithuanian Defense Ministry (McMichael, 91, p.
10). Security force activity expanded throughout the region on June 8 with
OMON attacks against border posts in all three Baltic republics. Despite
Western protests and Gorbachev's own efforts toward Baltic independence
vis-a-vis the Nine-Plus One Agreement, the attacks continued and greatly
undermined Gorbachev's bargaining position in his attempts to obtain
commitments for Western aid at the mid-summer Group of Seven
economic summit.
The proceeding paragraphs chronicled the development and
implementation of a high level command and control structure for the
violent enforcement of hard-line policy. The apparatus was dependent
upon the unquestioning support of the troops under its control. The armed
forces as a whole and the army in particular, however, were suffering
from a growing disillusionment toward the conservative elements of the
High Command. The long-term effects of reform and the rising tide of
nationalism had served to significantly undermine the lock-step loyalty
expected of the lower echelons of the armed forces.
Historically, life in the Soviet military has been very harsh. Over
the past fifteen years 120,000 soldiers have died, without counting the
casualties of Afghanistan, with fifty percent of these deaths resulting from
suicide . Another twenty percent may be attributed to "inflicted injuries",
the official term for homicide, as a result of hazing and ethnic conflict.
The internal discipline problems of the military have been further
complicated by a rapidly diminishing draft pool and the resultant decline in
quality of conscripts. The faltering Soviet health system has resulted in the
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deferment of a substantial portion of the draft-age population. The
reduction of the draft pool has led to the overall lowering of educational
standards within the military with the number of inductees lacking a high
school education increasing six-fold in the past three years. An additional
obstacle to discipline and combat readiness came in the form of one in four
conscripts having a criminal record. Among those eligible to serve there
developed an increasing tendency to resist the draft. According to
Lieutenant General Ivan Matveyev, a manpower specialist, 86,000 recruits
failed to report to induction centers. Although the republics of Russia,
Belorussia, Azerbaijan and the Ukraine were able to meet enlistment
quotas, results throughout the remaining republics were uniformly poor
with many potential conscripts choosing to serve in local militia units. The
manpower shortfalls, according to the top ranking political commissar in
the military, General Nikolai Shlyaga, resulted in "increasing the tension of
military service" as well as heightening "physical and moral and
psychological fatigue." For those in the military the politics of reform has
imposed serious shortfalls in the quality of military life. The withdrawal
of troops from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe has severely strained the
military's housing resources. By April, 1991 there were an estimated
192,000 military families without housing. In Moscow alone, 10,800
officers' families were without apartments. The availability of food was an
additional concern, particularly for troops stationed in the Baltics and the
Caucasus. (Schoenfeld, 91, p. 10)
The mounting hardships of military life, in conjunction with the
growth of nationalism and liberalism within the lower echelons of the
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armed forces, fostered an atmosphere conducive to the development of
non-traditional loyalties. This was most evident in the growing support for
Yeltsin by Russian members of the military. Yeltsin's popularity was a
decisive departure from his reputation as being anti -military. His new
found appeal to the military was the result of a careful campaign keynoted
by his association with respected members of the military.
3. Media developments
Under glasnost and perestroika the Soviet media had developed an
ever increasing ability to successfully mold public opinion. A spirit of
independence from political patronage had developed and fostered a
generation of editors and journalists difficult for the Kremlin to intimidate.
The media emerged at the forefront of political opposition to the
Communist Party through their exposure of official corruption, the
privileges of the elite and the mismanagement of the economy (Smith, 91,
pp. 150-151). The growing liberalism of the media, encouraged by the
anti-censorship law of 1990, was to become a major point of contention for
Gorbachev during his return to conservatism.
Soviet central state television, Gostel, flourished during the height
of glasnost. A wealth of new programming was developed which were to
become object lessons of democratic debate. Programs such as Vzglyad,
600 Seconds, and Fifth Wheel actively sought to expose the past and present
failings of the Communist Party. By late 1990, Gorbachev clearly had
endured as much criticism as he was willing to accept from Gostel, which
the Party regarded as their outlet (Smith, 91, p. 566). In an effort to
reverse the process he had initiated in 1985, Gorbachev appointed Leonid
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Kravchenko as the new head of Gostel. Kravchenko, a hard-line Party
loyalist, instituted a program of tight control and firm discipline as
concerned Soviet television. First to fall was Vzglyad, which pressed to air
Shevardnadze's dramatic resignation as Foreign Minister and was cancelled
as a result. Kravchenko converted Gostel into a state-owned corporation,
serving Gorbachev, and required all key journalists and producers to
renegotiate their contracts. Those considered to be too independent were
simply not rehired. In the end Gorbachev got what he wanted, a media
organ which toed the Party line, but at the cost of credibility and the
development of a rival television station politically sponsored, protected
and financed by Yeltsin and the Russian republic (Smith, 91, pp. 570-571).
The new network reinstated many of the programs banned by Gostel and
served as an open conduit for the reformists.
Non-government radio also developed during this period, the
prime example being the creation of Radio Echo Moscow in August of
1990. The station sought to fill the role occupied by Radio Liberty,
regarded as the best medium of dissemination by government reformists,
and provide uncensored reporting from within the Soviet Union (Korzun,
91, p. 3). Supported by the non-Communist Moscow City Council, the
station was to become a major outlet of information during the coup.
The 1990 press law had a similar impact on the print media. The
easing of government restrictions spawned the proliferation of new
publications and news services throughout the Soviet Union. In Moscow,
the reforms led to the development of an independent news service and a
wealth of periodicals tailored to the tastes of their respective audiences.
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Under the new conditions of competition, the traditional print outlets of the
Communist Party, Pravda and Izvestia, suffered from plummeting
circulation (Smith, 91, p. 577). In their place rose reformist periodicals,
such as Moscow News, Kuranty and Roissiya, which would later play a
major role in the dissemination of information during the coup.
The attempted crackdown on the press which accompanied
Gorbachev's return to the right was accomplished through economic
means. Reluctant to repeal the anti-censorship legislation, the State and
Party sought to restrict the lifeblood of the new press - paper supplies,
distribution, and printing plants. The effort proved to be insufficient and
resulted in the increased detachment of the independent media from the
vestiges of the state. In turn, the hard-liners forged strong alliances with
press outlets favorable to their views. Krasnaya Zvezda, Pravda and
Sovetskaya Rossiya became the mouthpieces of conservatism. Ultimately,
the SCSE appeared to fall victim to the age-old pitfall of politics - they
began to believe their own press.
C. SUMMARY
The SCSE represented the long-term failing of the Communist Party,
the development of a leadership based on Party loyalty and longevity rather
than competence and public approval. In contrast, the opposition was able
to provide a leadership freely elected by the Russian populace. The
opposition was further distinguished by their ability to function during a
crisis situation in a manner far superior to the SCSE.
The political, military, and media developments leading up to the coup
revealed the common theme of a failure on the part of Party hard-liners to
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fully stem the tide of reform within the Soviet Union. The efforts of the
SCSE, however, reflected a concerted effort to prepare for a military
backed coup. The reasons behind the inability of the SCSE to carry
through with their plans is the focus of the Chapter IV.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COUP AND CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the coup is presented in two sections. The first section
outlines the significant events of the coup with an emphasis on major
turning points. The second section examines the coup within the
framework of the Coup Operations Process Model (COPM) developed in
Chapter II. The analysis focuses upon the functional areas that
encompassed the key strengths and weaknesses of the SCSE and the
opposition.
A. CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
1 . August 16
The first reported official act of the SCSE was the distribution of a
secret KGB memo, signed by Kryuchkov, which immediately doubled the
pay of all KGB agents. Two subsequent cables raised all KGB bureaus to an
alert status and directed the destruction of documents. (Keller, 91, p. A16)
2. August 18
The SCSE delegation to Foros was preceded by Yazov,
presumably to oversee the security arrangements required for the
detainment of Gorbachev (Keller, 91, p. A 16). The actual five-man
delegation, consisting of Boldin, Baklanov, Varrenikov, Shenin and
Plekhanov, was to arrive at Gorbachev's villa at 4:50 P.M. (Teague, 91, p.
35). Despite concern on the part of Gorbachev's bodyguards, the
delegation was admitted into the estate and presented the demands of the
SCSE to Gorbachev. By his own account, Gorbachev was afforded two
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options; 1) officially declare a state of emergency and remain at Foros or
2) relinquish his powers to the Vice-President (Gorbachev, 91, p. 20).
Refusing to accept either option, Gorbachev was placed under detention
and his estate was surrounded by frontier ground and naval units under the
direct control of Plekhanov (Gorbachev, 91, p. 20).
Upon the return of the delegation from Foros, a secret meeting
was convened by Kryuchkov at the Kremlin under the pretense of the
development of a grave situation. In addition to Kryuchkov, the meeting
was attended by Lukyanov, Bessmertnykh, Shenin, Boldin, Plekhanov and
the membership of the SCSE, less Tizyakov and Starodubstev. Shenin,
Boldin and Baklanov recounted their visit to Foros with the embellishment
of having seen Gorbachev lying unconscious in bed. While the exact nature
of his "illness" had not been determined, the SCSE was certain that he
would be unable to carry out his duties for some time. Kryuchkov then
darkened the picture with a report of armed concentrations of citizens
gathering around the main post office, the Ukraine Hotel and other points
in Moscow and of the confiscation of four "hit lists", including one which
listed the names of government members marked for immediate execution.
Kryuchkov was followed by Plekhanov who reported on similar gatherings
around the Kremlin, KGB headquarters and Pushkin Square, from which
an additional two hit lists had been confiscated. Kryuchkov proceeded to
wave the lists in the air and demanded a declaration of a state of
emergency. The meeting adjourned with the decision to call a session of
the Supreme Soviet on August 26 to ratify the the actions of the SCSE.
(Robinson, 91, pp. A4-A5)
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3. August 19
Kryuchkov's call for action was answered at 4:00 A.M. when
Yanayev declared a state of emergency in parts of the Soviet Union and
assumed the presidency under the provisions of Article 127-7 of the Soviet
Constitution (Trimble, 91, p. 55). Shortly thereafter, Yazov issued Coded
Telegram 8825 which ordered the military to a heightened alert status,
recalled furloughed personnel and increased security at key military
installations. The Taman Guards, Dzerzhinsky and Kantimirovskaya
Mechanized Divisions and units of the Rayazan Airborne Division were
ordered to secure strategic points in Moscow (Trimble, 91, p. 55).
In sharp contrast to the measures taken to ensure Gorbachev's
isolation, the SCSE failed from the start to effectively isolate Yeltsin.
Warned by aides and reformist politicians as early as 5:00 A.M., Yeltsin
was able to gather the Russian Republic leadership by 7:00 A.M. and begin
the development of a plan to oppose the coup prior to the official
announcements of the formation of the SCSE by TASS and Radio Moscow
(Trimble, 91, p. 57). The announcement of the assumption of power by
Yanayev and the SCSE was immediately followed by the release of
declarations which were broadcast on all channels of Soviet television
throughout the day. They included "An Address to the Soviet People", "A
Declaration of Soviet Leadership" and the sixteen-point Resolution No. 1 of
the emergency committee which placed a ban on strikes, demonstrations
and rallies and imposed press censorship. The resolution specifically tasked
the MVD, KGB, Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Defense with the
maintenance of public order and state security. Finally, Yanayev issued an
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address to foreign heads of state and the UN Secretary General assuring
them that the introduction of emergency rule would in no way alter the
Soviet Union's international obligations, treaties and agreements. (Teague,
91,p.36)
As the first official reports of the SCSE were being broadcast,
Yazov was meeting with his chief generals in a 6:00 A.M. meeting at the
Defense Ministry. Yazov repeated Kryuchkov's ruse that unidentified
forces were planning to seize power and demanded the military back the
SCSE in order to preserve order. Yazov directly warned his generals to
avoid the use of force and not to allow themselves to be provoked. Yazov
concluded the conference by advising his generals that further information
would be disseminated by radio reports. (Trimble, 91, p. 57)
The first sign of overt military activity in Moscow occured at 9:00
A.M. with the arrival of several columns of armored vehicles and tanks.
The military vehicles took up key positions outside key state buildings,
including the Russian parliament, and along main thoroughfares of the
capital. (Trimble, 91, p. 57, Teague, 91, p. 38)
The initial civil reaction to the SCSE has been characterized as one
of indifference and timidity (Trimble, 91, p. 55). The initial protest at
Manezh square numbered less than two hundred people out of eleven
million people in the Moscow area. Those present were cursing the junta
and calling for an opposition movement. As the protest slowly grew, an
armored column of the Dzerzhinsky Division arrived and was met head on
by the protesters. Rather than risk death or injury to civilians, the column
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stopped, setting the tone for military action throughout the coup. (Cullen,
91, p. 64)
The "official" voice of opposition was first heard at 11:00 A.M.
with the CNN broadcast of a Yeltsin press. Yeltsin described the coup as a
mad and illegal act and vowed "never to be removed by anyone but the
people of Russia" (Teague, 91, p. 39). He demanded the reinstatement of
Gorbachev and appealed to the Russian population to stage protests in
support of democracy. Following the conference, Yeltsin ventured out to
address the citizens of Russia that had gathered around the parliament.
Speaking to a crowd of no more than 3,000 people, Yeltsin called for an
immediate general strike to protest against Gorbachev's unconstitutional
ouster and the establishment of a "right-wing, reactionary and
anticonstitutional" government (Trimble, 91, p. 57). Yeltsin also issued a
presidential edict declaring the SCSE illegal, its members guilty of treason
and its orders invalid in the Russian republic. He ordered all army and
KGB units involved in the coup to stand down and declared that he was
assuming control throughout the Russian republic. (Teague, 91, p. 39)
Yanayev and the SCSE conducted a press conference at the Press
Center of the USSR Foreign Ministry at 5:00 P.M.. The conference was
broadcast live on Soviet television and attended by the world's press corps.
Flanked by the other members of the SCSE, Yanayev told reporters that he
had assumed the title of acting president and was the chief spokesman for
the committee. Yanayev said the declaration of a state of emergency had
been necessary because the country had become ungovernable and faced a
"slide into catastrophe" following the "emergence of multiple power
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centers" (Teague, 91, p. 39). Yanayev asserted that Gorbachev was
"undergoing treatment in the south of the country" and "it is our hope that
Mikhail Gorbachev, as soon as he feels better, will take up again his office"
(Hitchings, 91, p. 622). The same explanation was offered in 1964, when
Nikita Krushchev was toppled from power. The conference closed with a
warning from Yanayev to the Russian populace that their acts of resistance,
the manning of barricades in particular, could result in military response
(Teague, 91, p. 40).
In an edict released by TASS, Yanayev declared a state of
emergency in Moscow and appointed Colonel General Nikolai Kalinin as
military commandant of the city. The state of emergency was the direct
result of the failure of citizens to obey the resolution issued earlier in the
day banning rallies, demonstrations and strikes (Teague, 91, p. 40).
As the first day of the coup drew to a close, elements of the Taman
Guards and Rayazan Airborne Divisions were reported to have disobeyed
orders and assumed defensive positions around the perimeter of the Russian
parliament. Soldiers, nominally under the control of the coup leaders,
repeatedly told reporters that they would not fire on civilians (Foye, 91, p.
7).
4. August 20
Yeltsin's opposition to the SCSE was formalized with the issuance
of an ultimatum addressed to Lukyanov. Yeltsin demanded that he be
allowed to meet with Gorbachev within twenty-four hours in the presence
of Yanayev; that Gorbachev be given a full medical examination; and, if
found to be in good health, be restored to power; that all media restrictions
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be lifted; that all troops be withdrawn from Moscow; and that the SCSE be
disbanded. The ultimatum was followed by the promulgation of a
presidential edict which announced that Yeltsin was taking control of all
units of forces on the territory of the Russian republic. He declared all
orders issued by Yazov and Kryuchkov invalid and ordered the formation
of an independent Russian National Guard. The edict was read on Radio
Triana, which broadcast from the Russian parliament throughout the coup.
(Teague, 91, pp. 45-46)
The growing strength of the opposition was mirrored by the
breakdown of cohesion amongst those who had organized the coup. This
was due partly to the failure of the CPSU leadership to fully back the SCSE
and partly due to disagreements within the SCSE over the use of force
against Yeltsin and others barricaded inside the Russian parliament. The
end result was the gradual disillusionment of the SCSE, with Pavlov the
first to resign. (Hitchings. 91, p. 623)
As night fell in Moscow, Kalinin announced on Central Television
that a curfew was being declared in the capital (Teague, 91, p. 51). Yeltsin
and the opposition leadership interpreted this as a prelude to military
action against the Russian parliament. The pro-resistance attitude of the
army, particularly its paratroops, indicated that any action would be on the
part of the KGB Alpha Group and KGB paratroop units. Forces thought to
be both capable of seizing the building and willing to follow an order to do
so (Cullen, 91, p. 78). The feared attack never materialized, prompting
calls from Yanayev and Kryuchkov to Yeltsin which indicated the SCSE
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was becoming aware that they would be obliged to negotiate with the
Russian president (Teague, 91, p. 51).
5. August 21
The failure to assault the Russian parliament marked the decisive
turning point of the coup. The SCSE would not, or could not, use violence
to control the population and, therefore, could not enforce their will and
were doomed to failure. The demise of the SCSE was accelerated by a
series of denouncements issued by the CPSU and the Supreme Soviet
(Teague, 91, p. 52).
The actions of the Soviet central government were paralleled in
the military leadership. In a heated exchange at the Defense Ministry,
Shaposhnikov and supporters from the Navy and Airborne Forces
presented Yazov with an ultimatum to denounce the SCSE and order the
withdrawal of forces. When Yazov refused, the senior military leaders
overruled him and approved the order for the withdrawal of troops from
Moscow (Trimble, 91, p. 67).
In the Kremlin, the remaining members of the SCSE met to
consider how to deal with the loss of political and military support. The
conspirators decided to send a delegation to Gorbachev to negotiate an end
to the coup. The delegation, consisting of Yazov, Kryuchkov, Baklanov
and Tizyakov, was refused by Gorbachev and instead arrested. The
delegation and Gorbachev returned to Moscow, arriving early on 22
August. In the subsequent days, the remainder of the SCSE were arrested,
with the exception of the deceased Pugo, as well as Lukyanov,
Bessmertnykh, Boldin, Varennikov, Shenin, Plekhanov, KGB First Deputy
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General Grishko, and Colonel General Generalov, Plekhanov's deputy
(Hitchings, 91, p. 654).
B. ANALYSIS
The COPM provides the structural framework for the analysis of the
coup. The following sections highlight specific weaknesses and strengths of
the SCSE and the opposition as concerns the development and
implementation of their respective C3I processes.
1. Environments
The COPM contains two distinct environments; an immediate
operational environment and an extended environment. For the purpose of
this analysis, the immediate operational environment has been defined as
the city of Moscow and the extended environment as foreign nations with
an emphasis on Western democracies.
2. Sense
The sense function includes the the systems and procedures
available to gather data on the environment and deny this capability to the
opposition. The function is of critical importance in the conduct of a coup
with respect to controlling the flow of information within the environment.
The SCSE possessed a decisive advantage at the onset of operations through
the official channels of censorship and control as concerned the print and
broadcast media, and internal communication services. The inability of the
SCSE to exercise this advantage and effectively control the flow of
information during the coup was a major cause of their failure.
The SCSE placed the crackdown on the Soviet mass media high on
the list of priorities. Announcing the group's media policy, Yanayev said
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the media bore much of the responsibility for the "current chaos" in the
Soviet Union (Tolz, 91, p. 23). Accordingly, the second resolution of the
SCSE was devoted to the media and the imposition of strict censorship.
The resolution temporarily banned the publication of newspapers in
Moscow and Moscow Oblast with the exception of those specifically
approved by the SCSE. Seven of the the original nine publications
approved were published by the CPSU. The selection of publications
directly mirrored the alliances formed between the hard-liners and the
conservative press in the months preceding the coup. The SCSE's
resolution also stated that all periodicals published in the Union would
have to be approved by a special body that the committee intended to
establish. In the interim, the responsibility for censorship was tasked to the
military (Tolz, 91, p. 24).
The resolutions concerning the press were accompanied by
similar measures aimed at the broadcast media. The SCSE replaced all
regular programming on Russian Television with Central Television
programs devoted to sports, music and the decrees and hourly
announcements of the SCSE. Radio Rossii was banned and the frequency
used by Radio Mayak was turned over to the sanctioned Radio Moscow- 1.
Independent Moscow radio stations were surrounded by troops and ordered
to cease broadcasting (Tolz, 91, p. 24, Hitchings, 91, p. 622). The extent
of the SCSE's intent to control the internal flow of information can be
summarized in order issued by General Moiseyev to major military
commands and MVD directorates:
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...make maximum use of all means and methods to explain
the correctness of the measures being taken by the emergency
committee. In order to close off the channels of information
and agitation against the measures being taken by the
emergency committee, it was ordered to take account of and,
as necessary, guard all technical equipment for the
transmission of information, regardless of the departments to
which they belong: television, radio, broadcasting stations,
communications of the USSR Ministry of Railways, the
weather service, traffic control points on the subway, taxi
stands, and other sites. (Burnov, 91, p. 32).
The extensive measures proposed by the SCSE proved, with a few
exceptions in the Baltics, to be impossible to implement. Despite the press
ban, the Moscow periodicals Moscow News, Megapolis-Express, Kuranty,
and Rossiya managed to publish emergency issues. The coalition produced
four copies using a typewriter and distributed xeroxed copies in Moscow.
A second coalition of suppressed periodicals prepared a joint periodical,
Obshchaya Gazeta, which was printed outside Moscow and then smuggled
back into the city (Tolz, 91, p. 25).
The control of broadcast media within Moscow proved equally
difficult to implement due in equal part to the tenacity of the journalists
and ineptitude in enforcement. The case of Radio Echo Moscow provides
an excellent example. The station, Moscow's first independent, began its
broadcast on 19 August with a mix of official TASS statements and
unofficial news provided by station reporters. Soviet KGB officials did not
arrive at the station until 7:40 A.M. The leader of the contingent ordered
the station manager to cease broadcasting, but in the absence of written
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orders or an explanation, the manager refused. The KGB continued trying
to persuade the manager to shut down, claiming they themselves did not
know what was happening. During the conversation Radio Echo Moscow
fell silent, the main switch to the transmitter which belonged to the
Ministry of Communication had been opened. The KGB cleared and
locked the studio and posted a three-man guard which disappeared within
an hour. In the words of the station manager, "It just didn't seem serious"
(Cullen, 91, p. 70). Radio Echo Moscow was to remain silent only until
the following afternoon when the Ministry of Communications, under
pressure from the Moscow City Council, restored the connection between
the studio and its transmitter. The station was able to establish a direct
phone link with the Russian parliament and broadcast tapes of Yeltsin's
statements and interviews with resistance leaders for the duration of the
coup. The dissemination of resistance information was furthered by the
establishment of Radio Triana within the parliament and the allotment of
frequencies to Radio Rossii from the BBC (Cullen, 91, pp. 69-70).
The SCSE proved incapable of even controlling the media which
they had sanctioned. The conservative Central Television news program
Vremya managed to give the impression that it supported Yeltsin on the
evening of August 19. The program screened footage of protest
demonstrations in Moscow and interviews with citizens who had come to
defend the Russian parliament. During the SCSE press conference a
correspondent from Pravda managed to inform listeners and viewers of
Yeltsin's decree outlawing the coup by carefully posing questions to the
committee (Tolz, 91, p. 24).
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The SCSE also failed to control internal phone communications
during the course of the coup. Although they successfully isolated
Gorbachev, the committee only severed the special government phone lines
of the Russian parliament. With the remaining circuits, Yeltsin and the
resistance were able to establish a viable network for the gathering of
information and the dissemination of instructions (Cullen, 91, p. 71).
In summary, the SCSE had the means and the intent to effectively
control the flow of information within the Soviet Union. Conceivably, the
committee could have replicated the total news blackout imposed during the
establishment of martial law in Poland in December 1981. Their failure to
do so demonstrated a clear lack of planning and resolve as well as a decided
underestimation of the resistance to be expected from the Soviet media.
3. Decide
The decision function encompasses the critical juncture between
analysis and action. The decision processes of the SCSE were hampered by
a lack of resolve within the committee to use the necessary force that might
have insured their hold on power. The committee members were
distinguished neither by their intelligence nor by their decisiveness and
acted accordingly during the crisis (Foye, 91, p. 8).
The indecisiveness of the committee was evident from the start as
chronicled by SCSE member Starodubstev. Recounting the meeting
convened by Kryuchkov on August 18, Starodubstev stated:
But, when the issue was raised of the president having been
ill, and no one could give us any intelligent explanation as to
what was wrong with him and how ill he was. ..then "everyone
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began to have doubts at once. ..whether the whole affair should
be delegated to the Supreme Soviet and postponed....and
Yanayev didn't want to sign anything for a very long time
because he had thought and said this to us: Gentlemen, he said,
I don't really know whether to put this down that he is ill or
not. I cannot know about his illness for certain. I just heard
about it from someone else. So the others simply said to him:
It's up to you to make the decision. You've got to decide for
yourself after all. (Burnov, 91, pp. 31-32).
The indecisiveness of the SCSE was also pronounced by Colonel Vikto
Alksinis in his explanation of his wavering of support for the committee:
We got an order from by telegram from Moscow to get the
troops ready for battle. ...I was told that the order said to place
a guard around the important points in the city. But after that
there was nothing but silence from Moscow. Just before I left
Riga, I went to the headquarters of the OMON, the special
police unit. And they were also ready, but had no commands
to act. I can't guess why. Obviously, if you make a decision
you've got to move on it. Every hour is important. Otherwise
you lose the initiative. (Cullen, 91, p. 75).
The SCSE's inability to reach decisions and the resultant loss of initiative
plagued them throughout the course of the coup. Key indicators of
indecisiveness included the failure to deploy forces until twelve hours after
the arrest of Gorbachev, the dispatching of troops to arrest Yeltsin after
the official announcement of the coup, the arrival of KGB and MVD units
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late on the nineteenth and the issuance of vague orders to forces under their
control (Schweizer, 91, p. 27).
The reasons behind the SCSE's decision-making shortcoming
became apparent during investigations of the coup. The failure to include
either Yazov or Moiseyev in the critical meeting of August 18 isolated the
military from the inception of the coup and caused a crucial delay in the
movement of forces which was never rectified. The behavior of the SCSE
membership during the coup was also brought to light with reports of
drunkenness on the part of Yanayev and Pavlov (Hitchings, 91, p. 655).
The committee was also hampered by the growing disillusion of its
membership. Prior to the conclusion of the junta three of the eight
members would succumb to what has been labeled the "coup flu" (Trimble,
91, p. 64). In short, the SCSE lacked the internal fortitude to effectively
deal with a crisis of its own creation and did not allow those capable of
action to take the lead. The inability to implement an effective decision-
making process precluded the formation of an effective pro-coup C3I loop.
4. Act
The act function serves as the interface between the decision-
maker and the environment. The function includes the direct application of
force as well as the full range of economic and political options available to
control the environment. The failure of the SCSE to utilize the application
of force has been discussed and will be further developed in the following
sections. In the area of political action, the SCSE sought unsuccessfully to
legitimize its actions and to appease both the Western world and the Soviet
populace. The leading edge of the campaign for political credibility was
5 6
the announcement of the imposition of a state of emergency within the
context of Soviet constitutional law. Yanayev's assumption of the
presidency and the declaration of a state of emergency was reported to be
in accordance with Article 127 of the Soviet Constitution. The SCSE was
careful to establish both the surrounding scenario, Gorbachev's illness, and
the limits of the state of emergency, "in particular localities" and for six
months only, to preclude the requirement to notify and obtain the
permission of the Supreme Soviet (Thorsen, 91, pp. 20-21). This isolated
attention to detail clearly reflected the political vice military shadings of
the SCSE. The committee also demonstrated its desire for global
legitimacy by ensuring the West that all of the Soviet Union's international
obligations, treaties and agreements would remain in effect (Teague, 91, p.
36). Western powers, however, summarily refused to recognize the SCSE.
In summary, the SCSE was not able to exert the requisite levels of
influence over either the internal or external environments through both
military and political action.
5. Higher levels of control
The higher level force structures of the SCSE were developed
during Gorbachev's swing to the right in the year preceeding the coup. As
previously discussed, the political and military leaders of the junta had
ample opportunity to develop the requisite chains of command for a
successful assumption of power. As the events unfolded, however, the
weaknesses of the actual command hierarchy of the SCSE were soon
revealed, as were the strengths of the opposition leadership.
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A fatal flaw in the development of the SCSE was in the enlistment
of support from the military leadership. In the months prior to the coup,
the military High Command had been characterized as being controlled by
"a clan of Far Easterners"(Hough, 91, p. 306). The writer was referring
to the close personal relationships between Yazov, Varrenikov and
Moiseyev. The remaining members of the High Command clearly could
have felt left out and by all indications were. The extent of the rift
between the "clan" and the remainder of the general staff was apparent
from the inception of the coup. Leading the resistance to the proposed
actions of the SCSE was Shaposhnikov who issued the following statement
concerning the actions of military commanders during the coup:
We soldiers are obliged to carry out orders, but there is no
place for tanks in the city. They must be pulled out, the
barricades dismantled and the confrontation must be replaced
by a dialogue with the president and government of Russia.
The following commanders-in-chief spoke at the collegium
session with the minister: the Air Force (Air Force General
Shaposhnikov), the Navy (Fleet Admiral Chernavin), the
Strategic Rocket Forces (Army General Maksimov). They
called for troops to withdraw from the city. (Krayniy, 91, p.
62).
Given that these comments were made on August 21, reasonable doubt
could exist as to the validity of the stated opposition. However, actions by
each of the commanders mentioned indicated a steadfast resistance to the
SCSE. Shaposhnikov had ordered all helicopter assets to stand-down and
issued instructions for fighters to be ready to intercept and shoot down, if
necessary, Army helicopters enroute to the Russian parliament (Auster, 91,
p. 66). Maksimov directed that no land-based missiles could be launched
without direct orders from him and returned the SS-25 single warhead
mobile missiles to garrison to preclude an accidental nuclear incident
(Hitchings, 91, p. 639). The Navy also refused to follow an order to
mobilize ballistic missile submarines (Auster, 91, p. 66).
The uniform failures of the SCSE were also apparent within the
command hierarchy of the Army, the institution most critical to the success
of the coup. The failure of the coup leaders to adequately prepare their
immediate subordinates was clearly evidenced in the statements of Colonel
General Kolesnikov, the acting commander in chief of the Ground Forces
in the absence of Varrenikov:
The defense minister's report came as a suprise to me, but
the troops are undoubtedly ready to perform the tasks assigned
to them. (Krayniy, 91, p. 61).
Clearly, however, Kolesnikov was incorrect with respect to the
preparedness of his forces.
The gravest blow to the military structure of the SCSE was the
outright defection of Colonel General Grachev, the commander of Army
Airborne Forces, to the opposition. Contacted by Yeltsin on the morning
of August 19, Grachev immediately offered the services of the Rayazan
Airborne Division, under Major General Lebed, to protect the Russian
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parliament (Burbyga, 91, p. 59). Lebed's troops were joined by elements
of the Taman Guards in the defense of Yeltsin and the parliament (Church,
91, p. 37). The planned attack on the parliament also fell victim to high
level defection when General Karpulikin, commander of the KGB Alpha
Unit, refused to engage his forces against the opposition (Burbyga, 91, p.
59). Faced with a rapidly diminishing power base, the SCSE attempted to
send in the KGB's Vitebskaya airborne division. The division commander,
however, halted his troops twelve miles from the Russian parliament and
refused to enter the city (Church, 91, p. 37).
The failure of the military leadership to support the SCSE should
have come as no suprise to Yeltsin. The Russian president and his key
advisors, Rutskoi and Kobets, had actively courted reformists within the
High Command prior to the coup. Earlier in the year, the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe had invited one of Kobet's deputies to
assemble a group of high-ranking officers to attend a conference in
Germany and among the first to be included were Shaposhnikov and
Grachev (Cullen, 91, p. 65). Kobets' staff made maximum use of contacts
within the Soviet military to interrupt established chains of command and
prevent the movement of forces against the parliament (Cullen, 91, pp. 64-
66). The opposition was able to ensure that the SCSE would be unable to
launch an airborne assault against the Russian parliament, considered to be
their last viable option, by enlisting the support of Army helicopter
squadron commanders who had served in Afghanistan with members of
Kobet's staff (Cullen, 91, p. 67).
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The SCSE's chain of command never extended as far as was
required for a successful military coup. Even if the SCSE been capable of
effective decisionmaking, it is unlikely they would have been able to effect
their decisions. A combination of defection and opposition intervention
effectively severed the head of the coup from its body of forces.
6. Lower levels of control
The lower levels of the command structure, the troops themselves,
proved reluctant to follow the few orders they were able to receive. As
discussed in the military development section, the Army was plagued by
morale and discipline problems. Had the SCSE been capable of moving
elite KGB and MVD units into Moscow prior to the coup, this would have
been of minimal impact. Instead, the forced reliance on reluctant forces
during the first critical hours of the junta became a major factor in the
SCSE's failure. Faced with the possibility of injuring or killing residents
of their own city, the Moscow-based troops readily abandoned the idea of
using force. For the SCSE, the failure of the common fighting man to
support the coup was a final blow to a flawed command structure.
7. Intelligence/Analysis
The intelligence/analysis function serves to assign meaning to
observed activities and situations and to assist in the development of
forecasts with respect to changes in the environment. In the case of the
Soviet coup, the ramifications of the function were most pronounced as
concerned the opposition forces. The SCSE, with the wealth of sources
available and the assumed support of the KGB, had an apparent advantage
which was never fully realized. The coup leadership, as discussed
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previously, proved incapable of exploiting any edge afforded by the proper
use of intelligence. In fact, the intelligence apparatus of the SCSE proved
to be a significant weakness due to widespread leaks to the opposition
forces.
The infiltration of the Soviet intelligence apparatus by the
opposition was, in many ways, similar to their penetration of the Soviet
military leadership. Yeltsin and his staff depended upon long term
relationships and the independent actions of reformers within intelligence
organizations. These intelligence windfalls were supplemented by the active
gathering of intelligence and aggressive correlation of sources by Yeltsin's
staff. The system was detailed by staff member Dmitri Rosnin:
We were warned by several sources. We got calls from
KGB officers and from military intelligence. My job was to
try to confirm the information that came in over the phone.
They had warned us that there may be disinformation, so each
source of information had to be verified by two or more
sources. ...The whole collective worked that way. We were
well informed (Cullen. 91, p. 78).
The apparatus established by the opposition was to serve it well
throughout the crisis. The following examples illustrate the significant
command and control edge obtained by the aggressive exploitation of
intelligence sources. The first significant leak occurred on the Sunday
preceding the coup, when Rosnin received a call from a former associate at
the Defense Ministry. The friend, who was the duty officer, informed
Rosnin that he had heard rumors of preparations for a military action in
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Moscow (Cullen, 91, p. 59). The rumors were substantiated early the
following morning by calls from Kazakhstan and Central Asia, which are
several time zones ahead of Moscow, that a state of emergency had been
declared (Trimble, 91, p. 56). This prior notification was the key factor
which allowed Yeltsin to flee his dacha minutes before the arrival of an
Alpha Unit and to arrive at the parliament ahead of advancing troops. The
opposition's intelligence network was also a key factor in the preemption of
the movement of forces required to seize the Russian parliament (Cullen,
91, p. 78). The flow of information to Yeltsin was to continue, without
interference for the remainder of the coup, much of it provided by
Kryuchkov's KGB (Trimble, 91, p. 58).
The advantage gained by the opposition through the aggressive
implementation of the intelligence function was a key element of strength
leading to their success.
8. Interface
As stated in the description of the CCOPM, control of the
functional interface separating the immediate operational and extended
environments is a key element in the successful conduct of a coup.
Successful control of the interface by the SCSE would have afforded the
ability to isolate the opposition and the Soviet populace from the extended
environment and potential sources of information, intelligence and support.
The SCSE possessed this capability, but failed to effectively exploit its
advantage.
Control of the interface by the SCSE was dependent upon the
effective censorship of foreign correspondents in Moscow. The decisions
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not to expel foreign journalists nor sever the the central satellite link at
Ostankinko appeared to have been taken deliberately by the SCSE to avoid
open confrontation with Western countries (Tolz, 91, p. 25). As a result,
the foreign media was able to show Western viewers up-to-the-minute film
of the situation in the Moscow streets. CNN, for example, broadcast the
striking footage of Yeltsin standing on a tank and delivering a speech to the
crowd gathered outside the Russian parliament. The transfer of
information out of the Soviet Union was by no means limited to television.
Radio Liberty was able to provide a direct conduit from the eleventh floor
of the parliament to broadcast facilities in Munich (Cullen, 91, p. 72). The
availability of information to foreign governments allowed the rapid
assessment and denouncement of the coup. The Bush administration
expressed its doubts for success as early as the second day of the coup,
when administration sources had predicted a no more than a fifty-fifty
chance of the SCSE's survival (Oberdorfer, 91, p. Al). President Bush,
acting on the assessment, subsequently released the following statement:
We're making very clear to the coup plotters and the coup
people that there will not be normal relations with the United
States as long as the illegal coup remains in effect (Devroy, 91,
p. Al).
The impact of Western action served to undermine the confidence of the
SCSE and to bolster Soviet civilian and military support for Yeltsin.
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The failure of the SCSE to control the flow of information out of
the Soviet Union resulted in the subsequent, though more significant,
retransmission of the information back into the country. Although the
government possessed the capability to jam foreign transmissions, the flow
of reports continued without interference for the duration of the crisis.
The opportunity was readily seized by Western broadcasters as evidenced
by the doubling of Russian-language programs and the relaying of the
banned broadcasts of Radio Russia by the BBC. Radio Liberty's 24-hour
broadcasts in Russian and eleven other Soviet languages reached an
estimated Soviet audience of 50 million persons. The network suspended
regular programming to run live news from the Russian parliament and
Yeltsin's outright pleas for international support. (Masland, 91, p. 39)
The SCSE also failed to control the telecommunications interface
between the operational and extended environments. All international
telephone calls to and from Moscow are routed through a single switch, but
the SCSE did not attempt to restrict the the placement of calls (Masland,
91, p. 39). This failure allowed Yeltsin and the opposition to know they
were being supported by the outside world (Hitchings, 91, p. 623). In
turn, the communications channels allowed Yeltsin to provide important
advice to the outside and to urge a concerted public outcry against the coup
by Western governments (Hoffman, 91, p. A27). Yeltsin's efforts were to
have a dramatic impact as evidenced by the statements of President Bush
and Prime Minister Major which denounced the SCSE and pledged support
to the reformers (Hitchings, 91, p. 623).
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C. SUMMARY
The C3I systems of the SCSE and the opposition, as amended by the
strengths and weaknesses discussed above, are presented in Figure 5.
FOREIGN NATIONS
OPPOSITION C3I SYSTEM il HLNU III SCSE C3I SYSTEM
Figure 5. Amended Coup Operations Process Model
The C3I deficiencies of the SCSE were key elements in the in the
ultimate failure of the coup. Through a combination of incomplete
preparation and poor implementation, the SCSE was never capable of
establishing a functional C3I system. The major areas of internal weakness
are determined to been in the functional areas of sense, decide, interface
control, and higher and lower levels of force control.
The weaknesses of the SCSE's C3I system were amplified by the
strengths of the opposition's system. The major areas of strength are
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determined to be in the functional areas of intelligence analysis, decide, and
higher levels of force control. More importantly, the individual successes
culminated in the formation of a complete opposition C3I loop structure
capable of operating in a more expedient fashion than the flawed SCSE
loop. As demonstrated during the coup, this advantage allowed the
opposition to operate a step ahead of the SCSE.
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